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ABSTRACT 
Although the attack on cryptosystem is 
ongoing especially for the design of S
heuristic method and algebraic method. Algebraic method as in current AES implementation 
has been proven to be the most secure S
concentrate on two kinds of method of c
and heuristic approach. The objective is to review a method of constructing S
comparable or close to the original construction of AES S
approach. Finally, all the listed S
their security performance wh
finding may offer the potential approach to develop a new S
original one.  
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The advance encryption standard (AES) is the most widely use symmetric cipher today. The 
term standard is supposed to use only for United States government application. However, 
AES block cipher also adapted in several industries standard and in many commercial systems. 
Several commercial standards that include AES are the Internet security standard IPSec, TLS, 
the Wi-Fi encryption standard IEEE 802.11i and numerous security products around the world. 
To date, there are several known theoretical attacks which are still impractical due to higher 
complexity as mention in [1]. 
AES was developed through competition held by National Institutes of Standard and 
Technology (NIST) of the United States in 1999. The competition aims to find the new 
cryptosystem for government use to replace the older data encryption standard (DES) 
cryptosytem, which was identified no longer viable for current implementation due to its 
security and implementation effectiveness. The present scheme of AES was originated from 
Rijndael algorithm that is developed by two Belgium cryptologist, which are Joan Daemon 
and Vincent Rijmen. Along with Rijndael algorithm, there were another four-finalist 
cryptosystem in the competition which named as Mars by IBM Corporation, RC6 by RSA 
Laboratorie, Serpand and lastly Twofish. Rijndael algorithm provides three options of key 
length, which are 128, 192 and 256 bit. On the existing AES implementation, only key of 
128-bit length was used. 
In every block cipher like AES, the only source of nonlinearity acts as the core structure of the 
cipher is the implementation of S-Box. This S-Box or substitution box provides confusion to 
obscure the relationship between the plaintext and the ciphertext. It will ensure that the small 
change in the plaintext will propagate quickly across the ciphertext. In the current AES 
implementation, the construction of S-Box is based on algebraic structure of finite field. It has 
been proven that this type of S-Box is still the best construction in terms of security against 
differential and algebraic attack [2]. However, the ongoing research on construction of S-Box 
has led to discovery of the new method which has similar security with better efficiency. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The complete structure of AES is reviewed in 
section II. In section III, the current construction of the AES S-Box is shown. While in section 
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IV and V, algebraic and heuristic method are discussed respectively. In section VI, some 
cryptographic properties of S-
in section IV and V will be compared with the current implementation. Lastly, section V
conclude the paper. 
 
2. AES STRUCTURE 
The AES receives the plaintext 
matrix cell represents 8-bits or 1
symmetric key k  in the same form of state matrix of plaintext and the output will be the 
ciphertext y . Fig. 1 shows the general struct
Fig.
The state matrix will then undergo 10 rounds of encryption where each round consists of four 
layers data manipulation. The four layers are named as 
AddRoundKey layer. The details of each layer are as follows:
 SubByte: The element in the state matrix 
S-Box lookup table. The nonlinearity of the S
plaintext and any small change in the plaintext will cause big altering to the output 
ciphertext. The output of this process is recognized as state matrix 
process will be explained in s
 ShiftRow: The state matrix 
This layer make change to all rows except the first row.
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 MixColumn: The output state matrix from 
constant MDS matrix. However, this layer is not available for the last encryption round.
 AddRoundKey: The output of MixColumn is then XORed with the sub key that was 
generated by key schedule. The flow details of all AES 
and decryption process are shown in Fig. 2.
However, in the original design of Rijndael algorithm, three key length option was 
which were 128-bits, 192-bits 
standard use. For longer key bits
round for 192-bits and 256-bits respectively.
 
3. CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION OF AES S
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structure including the encryption 
 
and 256-bits. NIST only adopted 128-bits key length for 
, more round of encryption needed, which are 12 and 14 
 
Fig.2. The flow structure of AES 
-BOX 
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The core of any block cipher like AES is the creation of S
construction of current AES S
and the affine transformation as shown in Fig. 3. To increase efficiency, all
two processes on every element in 
The existence of S-Box as the only nonlinear part of block cipher provides confusion to the 
input text and obscures the relat
Fig.3. The original construction of AES S
In current implementation, this source of confusion is originated from the algebraic 
complexity of arithmetic operation in finite field 
extension field of (2)GF , which onl
the operation between element canno
the field need to be represented as the polynomial with maximum d
definition, each element can be shown as follow 
7 6 5 4 3
7 6 5 4 3
2




, (2) {0   i
A x a x a x a x a x a x
a x a x a a GF
    
    
This representation also fit nicely to all element 
8-bit tuple as follows 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0A=(a , , , , , , ), a a a a a aa                                             
The 8(2 )GF  inversion involve the operation of finding inverses for all element in that field. 
There are 256 elements including 
1 0 if   
( )









                                      
From Equation (3), the inversion of every element are defined by using multiplicative modulo 
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8(2 )GF will be stored in a lookup table called as S
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8(2 )GF  as every polynomial can be stored as 
0 . We can define this field inversion as follows
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8(2 )  and affine 
8(2 )GF , 
(1) 
         (2) 
 
(3) 
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( )p x  where ( )p x  is the primitive polynomial in 8(2 )GF . The element 0  is mapped to itself. 
In the existing implementation, 8 4 3( ) 1p x x x x x      has been used. In this paper, this 
primitive polynomial will be notated in hexadecimal notation {11 }b . This will also be applied 
to other type of primitive polynomial.  
The selection of function like in Equation (3) was originated from the previous SHARK and 
Square cipher developed by the same developer of Rijndael. These two cipher adapt the idea 
from [3], where highly nonlinear permutation function is introduced. However, the use of 
non-permutation function as in Equation (3) alone does not enough as the S-Box function can 
be expressed as rational number of low degree [4].        
To bypass the drawback face by SHARK and Square cipher, while maintaining the use of 
highly nonlinear permutation function as in Equation (3), Rijmen and Daemen introduced the 
new composition of nonlinear permutation function with simple linear transformation (Fig. 3). 
This composition is motivated by the wide-trail strategy introduce in [5]. This strategy aims to 
hide the trail of linear transformation and achieving low difference propagation probabilities 
in order to secure the cipher against differential and linear cryptanalysis [6]. In this 
composition, each element of 8(2 )GF  can be viewed as the element of product modulo ( )p x  
as follows 
8 8 4 3
2(2 ) [ ] / ( 1)GF Z x x x x x                                                    (4) 
where all elements 8( ) (2 )A x GF  except zero is mapped to its inverses 1 8( ) (2 )A x GF   and the 
element 0 is mapped to itself. Then, the output of the 8(2 )GF  inverses will undergo the linear 
affine transformation as follows 
7 6 5 4
7 6 3 2 8
( 1) ( )
       ( ) mod ( 1)
iB x x x x A x
x x x x x
     
   
                                                (5) 
The affine transformation as in Equation (5) often represented as bitwise matrix form as 
follows 











1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
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      (6) 
In this bitwise representation of Equation (6), the output of 8(2 )GF  inversion and affine 
transformation are notated as 0 7( ,..., )
TB b b    and 0 7( ,..., )
TB b b  respectively. This 
construction produces S-Box with no fixed point and opposite fixed point, thus maintaining 
the nonlinearity of the permutation function as in Equation (3). This composition increase the 
confusion to the plaintext and as the consequences the attack complexity become higher. The 
significant of the affine transform  is to destroy all the algebraic structure of 8(2 )GF , which in 
turn prevent the cipher from the algebraic attack [7]. 
By all the above operation, the S-Box construction can be denoted as the composed function 
where the 8(2 )GF  denoted as F  and linear affine transformation denoted as L  as follows 
S H L F                                                                  (7) 
where H  is the additive constant in the affine transformation. This additive constant {63}  
remove all fixed point ( )S a a  and the opposite fixed point ( )S a a . The setting of 
Equation (7) can be analyzed using simple algebraic operation to reveal its unexpected 
algebraic properties that were not deeply studied at the beginning of the design time. This 
analysis will produce one single equation called as the algebraic expression which later taken 
as the source of modification of S-Box. The derivation of this expression using Equation (3) 
and the affine matrix in Equation (6). From Equation (3), we can define the field inversion of 
every nonzero element in 8(2 )GF  as 
81 2 2 254x x x   . Thus, we can rewrite Equation (3) as 
254( )F x x                                                                 (8) 
As for linear affine matrix L , it is linear map thus it can be expressed as a linearized 
polynomial with eight terms as follows 












                                                               (9) 
From Equation (9), the linearize polynomial can be derived into 
128 64 32 16
8 4 2          
( ) {8 } { 5} {01} { 4}
{25} { 9} {09} {05}
L x f x b x x f x
x f x x x
   
   
                                         (10) 
The coefficient of the above linearize polynomial can be derived using several methods. In [8] 
derived the equation using the method of q-polynomial, while in [9] used partition 
equivalence in order to resolve the coefficient of the expression. Another paper which 
discussed in brief about the expression like in [10] used the approach of the trace function. 
The last part of the AES S-Box lies within the affine transformation which is the additive 
constant {63}  that can be denoted as function H  in Equation (7). Combining Equation (8) 
and Equation (10) with respect to AES S-Box composition in Equation (7), the algebraic 




( ) {63} {8 } { 5} {01}
          { 4} {25} { 9}
          {09} {05}
S x f x b x x
f x x f x
x x
   
  
 
                                          (11) 
This final form of S-Box algebraic expression has risen up several questions among 
cryptologist community about its security as it has only nine terms, which might be the 
possible source of known cryptanalysis such as interpolation attacks. 
It is of interest to review every possible way to construct and modify the current 
implementation of AES S-Box. The construction that is originated from finite field operation 
and algebraic representation will be considered as the algebraic method. This method is 
believed to be the most secure way to generate S-Box as it achieves the best cryptographic 
properties. Meanwhile, there is another way other that algebraic method which may produce 
equivalence strength which is heuristic method. Both methods will be discussed separately in 
the next two section. 
 
4. ALGEBRAIC APPROACH 
4.1. Replacement of Primitive Polynomial and Affine Transformation 
The simplest way to construct the new S-Box is by replacing the current primitive polynomial 
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( )p x  with another primitive polynomial in the field 8(2 )GF  In [11], other primitive 
polynomials in the same field and additive constant has been shown able to generate unknown 
S-Box while maintaining the original structure of AES, thus preventing the known 
cryptanalysis. In that paper, the author listed all the 30 irreducible polynomials in 8(2 )GF  
that is possible for the construction of S-Box. The list of the primitive polynomial in this field 
is shown in Table 1. Besides the primitive polynomials, the author also presented a list of 
additive constants in affine transform which can be substituted in the original AES S-Box. 
This list consists of 36 different elements in 8(2 )GF , which will produce the S-Box with no 
fix point and the opposite fix point. The list of the additive constant is shown in Table 2. 
Using the list in Table 1 and Table 2, several combinations can be made which will produce 
different S-Box that have the same or even better security performance than the existing one. 
This combination also can possibly be part of the key that will strengthen the cryptosystem. 
The author has tried several combinations by using the NIST statistical test suite and found 
several combinations that is even better than the current implementation. 
Table 1. List of irreducible polynomials for AES S-Box 































Table 2. List of possible additive constant 
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Another uncomplicated way to reconstruct new S-Box, while maintaining the algebraic 
structure is by replacing the linear affine matrix as shown in Equation (6). This matrix in 
polynomial form as in Equation (5) which is 7 6 5 4 1x x x x    . It is possible this polynomial 
is replaced by another polynomial as long as the matrix produced is non-singular. There are 
about 632  possible polynomials for each primitive polynomial listed in Table 1 that can be 
used to generate affine matrix for the construction of S-Box. This possible polynomial is 
bounded from [01;02;04;08;10;20;40;80]T for lower end to [ ;7 ; ; ; ; 7; ; ]Tfe f bf df ef f fb fd  for higher 
end. Using the new combination of affine matrix with various primitive polynomial may 
improve the avalanche effect of the ciphertext. This has been proven in the same paper where 
four primitive polynomials which are 14 ,d 165, 17b  and 1bd  with various combination of 
affine matrix will produce the S-Box with full avalanche effect. Another paper which discuss 
the same method of modification is in [12], where different affine matrix was used. The end 
result shows that the new modified S-Box pass the randomness test. 
 
4.2. Algebraic Expression Modification 
The simple modification above seems convincing where they might have even better security 
than the existing one. Nevertheless, this type of modification does not improve much as the 
algebraic representation is still in the same condition where only nine terms are involved and 
thus still exposing the cipher to several known attacks such as interpolation attack. We 
rephrase the algebraic expression of AES S-Box as in Equation (11) from the previous section 









S x w w x 

                                                        (12) 
for certain constant 0 8,...,w w . Several researchers found that this is the only disadvantage of 
AES, which might be the source of attacks. Although in [14] it has been shown that the whole 
AES has very complex algebraic structure, it is of interest for cryptologist community to 
improve the AES S-Box in order it can resist the known attacks for a longer time. 
In previous section, we have highlighted the issue of algebraic expression which only consist 
of nine terms. This setting will remain even though the primitive polynomial or the affine 
transformation is replaced. However, the replacement of the affine matrix may change the 
coefficient of the terms in that expression. This representation is said to be extremely sparse 
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multivariate quadratic equations as it has the highest degree of 254 but involve only nine 
terms [15]. To improve this setting, 
new way is by switching the order of operation between affine transformation and 
inversion as in Fig. 4. 
This simple setting yield an algebraic expression with the highest degree of 254 and 255 
terms involved. This significant improvement is due to the simple modification of the 
composed function as in Equation 
S H F L                                                                 
Then, using this Equation (13
128 64 32 16
8 4 2 254
254 253 252
( ) ({8 } { 5} {01} { 4}
{25} { 9} {09} {05} ) {63}
      {05} {93} { }
{94} {63}
          
          
S x f x b x x f x
x f x x x
x x fd x
x
   
    
  
    
However, they are several varieties using this type of modification especially the position of 
additive constant. This varieties will not change the setting of algebraic expression 
255 terms. For example, the same author in 
(13) to 
S F L H                                                                 
where the first operation that acts on the inpu
affine matrix and field inversion. This simple modification has the same security aspect as the 
previous modification.  
In [18], the author has come out the comparison of three cases of S
The first case is the existing implementation of S
second case introduce some modification same as previous mentioned paper but wit
different. In this case, the input plaintext will undergo linear affine transformation first 
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followed by additive constant and ended by field inversion. This composition can be 
represented as 
S F H L                                                                 (16) 
The composition in Equation (16) maintained the setting with 255 terms and the algebraic 
degree of 254. Although the algebraic expression improves a lot, there is still one drawback 
due to this simple modification. All of S-Box function compositions mentioned in Equation 
(13), Equation (15) and Equation (16) improve the encryption side of expression while 
downgrading the decryption expression from 255 terms to only nine terms. The third cases 
fixed this problem by applying two affine transformation which is before and after field 
inverses operation. This configuration is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig.5. S-Box structure with two affine transformation 
The use of two affine transform for AES was first introduced in [10] and motivated by the 
Camelia cipher introduced in year 2000 [19]. By applying two affine transformation, the 
encryption and decryption algorithm will go through the same step of processes. This 
configuration will yield an algebraic expression with 255 terms and highest degree of 254 for 
both encryption and decryption algorithm. In composition form, two affine process as in Fig. 
5 can be expressed as follows 
S L H F H L                                                               (17) 
However, two affine transformation decrease the construction efficiency of the S-Box as more 
process needed. As for the security, this implementation is better than the other two cases.  
Another two variants of the composition Equation (17) were stated in [20-21]. In [20], 
emphasize the drawback of improvement made by [22] which reduce the algebraic expression 
terms from 255 to 9 for decryption algorithm. Using the same approach made by [10], the 
author add two affine transform before and after the field inversion. The constructed S-Box 
was then tested using six cryptographic characteristics which are bijection, strict avalanche, 
algebraic degree, nonlinearity, differential uniformity and algebraic complexity. All aspects 
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can be said comparable to existing AES except the improvement in algebraic complexity for 
the new implementation.  
In [21], the first affine transformation was adapted from binary Gray code transformation. 
This code is originally designed to spurious output from electromechanical switch. It aims is 
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0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
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    
    
                                       (18) 
while for the second affine transform after the field inversion is the same as in the existing 
implementation. This improvement make the algebraic expression to have 255 terms with 
highest degree of 254. The advantage of this implementation not only in term of algebraic 
expression but it is reusable from the original implementation. Using Gray code, the output 
S-Box can be said to has comparable security compared to existing one.  
Similar approach as Gray code has been summarize in [23] by the same author. A new way 
has been proposed to find the affine matrix using the graph isomorphism. Using this method, 
there are about 185.34 10  possible S-Box that can be generated. Five sample of S-Box has 
been shown in the paper and two of them have fulfilled the desired cryptographic 
characteristics.  
 
5. HEURISTIC APPROACH 
The modification of AES S-Box not only limited to manipulating primitive polynomial and 
field inversion as mentioned in previous section. The ongoing research has shown that the 
S-Boxes also can be modified using several other methods, which can be classified as 
heuristic approach. There are several of method of obtaining S-Boxes under heuristic 
approach. This paper will classify them into two part, which are chaotic maps approach and 
non-chaotic map approach.  
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5.1. Chaotic maps S-Box 
Chaotic maps are the maps that exhibits some chaotic behaviour which seems to be useful for 
generating good S-Boxes. This chaotic behaviour is highly unpredicted which have random 
look deterministic nature and usually use in the field of nonlinear dynamical system. Using 
chaotic maps, there are four step methods to construct cryptographically strong S-Boxes 
which are choosing chaotic maps, discretising the maps, key scheduling and cryptanalysis 
[24]. One example of chaotic maps that is also the most common used is the logistic map, 
which can be expressed as follows 
( ) (1 )x x x                                                                (19) 
The parameter   range is  0, 4 . However, the chaotic behavior only exists when 
3.56995   and the graph will diverge when this parameter exceeds 4.  The problem exists 
when this type of map or any other chaotic maps only deals with real number while in 
cryptographic, especially for S-Box deals with integer. Some example of mapping from real 
number to integer can be found in [25]. This set of converted integers usually used as the 
initial table range from 0 to 255. This initial table is then permuted several times more using 
second chaotic maps or any other suitable method to achieve good cryptographic 
characteristic S-Boxes. The method of acquiring the initial binary integer is by denoting the 
floating-point number x  as 
1 20. ,..., [,..,  0,1]ix b Ib b x                                                     (20) 

















                                                       (21) 











                                                             (22) 
Finally, the original real number generated using chaotic map as in Equation (19) can be 
expressed as integer binary sequence 0( ) { ( ( )}
n n
i i nB f x b x

  . In the same paper, the author 
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used another chaotic map which is Bake Map to reshuffle the initial permutation table several 
times.  
Another example like in [26] use the combination of cubic map, discrete chaos maps system 
(DCMS) and the affine transformation. The implementation is similar with [25] where the 
initial set of permutation is generated using cubic map. The only difference is the 
implementation of affine transformation like in the original AES S-Box. In [27], the 
construction of good S-Box was done using genetics algorithm which consist of selection, 
crossover adjustment and mutation operators. Like in previous example, the initial population 
(set of S-Box) which consist of individual S-Box was generated first via logistic and Bake 
map. Then, using the genetic algorithm, a stronger S-Box was selected and the strength is 
even better compared to previous implementation in [25-26].  
In more recent paper like [28], a more complicated map was used. This paper proposes the 
use of discrete chaotic map based on the composition and permutation. The permutation 
operation was motivated by [29] code. Using that code, the author developed a new one 
dimensional chaotic map in [30]. Using this map, a new S-Box was developed and has better 
cryptographic properties compared to S-Box in [25-27]. However, the same author also 
proposed another S-Box that based on the composition of classical chaotic map such as 
logistic, Chebyshev and tent map in [31]. The resulted S-Box is much better in term of 
nonlinearity compared to [28]. While in [32], the new S-Box was generated using another 
complex chaotic map. The generated S-Box was based on tangent delay for elliptic cavity 
chaotic sequence. All real number generated by that map was mapped to 16 16 S-Box matrix. 
Based on the security analysis, the generated S-Box has low nonlinearity compared to another 
mentioned chaotic map S-Box before.  
The permutation of S-Box element using chaotic maps can be change by controlling the 
parameter of the map. For example, in logistic map Equation (19), the control parameter is 
variable  and initial value 0x . Due to this condition, more than thousand S-Boxes can be 
generated by using chaotic map. In [33], the author introduced a method of teaching-learning 
based optimization (TLBO) to choose a proper value for chaotic map parameters 0( , )x . The 
optimization algorithm relies on the population of solution, (choice of parameters) to search 
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for global solution. The global solution is believed to generate the best output permutation of 
S-Box. Using this optimization method, together with Henon and logistic map, the generated 
S-Box can be said better than the random chosen parameter implemented in [25]. 
Another interesting usage of chaotic map in generating S-Box can be found in [34] with the 
implementation of 3-dimensional chaotic system. In this paper, the author used the 3-D four 
wing autonomous chaotic system to produce several number of S-Box. Due to freedom to 
change the initial point of each variable in the system, the author has developed about 500 
different S-Box and run the performance analysis on each of the S-Box. The result shows that 
the generated S-Boxes has good cryptographic properties but not as good as the 
implementation in [31]. One other example that implemented the same approach can be found 
in [35] used the Zhangtong chaotic system. To generate S-Box, the author used the RNG from 
the chaotic system and follow some predefine algorithm to produce all 256 elements of S-Box. 
The generated S-Box is as good as [34]. 
5.2. Non-Chaotic Maps S-Box 
Aside from chaotic maps approach, there are various other ways to construct AES S-Box. 
Usually, it involves more than one combination of method to acquire all permutation of 256 
elements of S-Box. The development of that method is done by stage. In 2013, in [2] 
proposed the S-Box constructed from non-permutation power function, which is totally 
opposite to the original AES S-Box. Using this kind of function will generate several 
redundant elements in the S-Box. The author took the composition of two power function to 
form a binomial power function from different cyclotomic classes motivated from [36] in the 
form of 
1 2F F                                                                  (23) 
where 8, (2 ).GF   The set of non-permutation function 1F and 2F are chosen so that it has 
higher nonlinearity. To deals with redundant elements, the author introduced a new algorithm 
named as the redundancy removal algorithm (RRA). The RRA will classify the element into 
two types which are the set of redundant elements and the set of non-existence element. The 
redundant element is then replaced with the non-existence element beginning with the 
smallest entry of redundant elements. The output of RRA will be one desired bijective S-Box 
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which is comparable to most chaotic map generated S-Box in terms of security. 
The same author made another improvement to Equation (23) in [37] by filtering the 
combination of power function where only power functions with higher nonlinearity and 
fewer redundant elements were selected. Besides that, two operation has been added which 
are addition with another power function and multiplication with coefficient. Based on this 
filtering method and additional operation, only three S-Boxes produced corresponded to two 
trinomial power function and one binomial power function. The S-Boxes from trinomial 
power function perform better compared to the other S-Box from binomial power function.  
Another varieties of constructing S-Box can be seen in [38] where the constructed S-Box 
were generated from the bee-waggle dance pattern. Bee waggle dance are the pattern of 
movement of bee to communicate or send information about food location, water source and 
new-site location to its colonies. This pattern give information about the current position of 
sun, directions and speed of wind. Combining this two information, the colonies can identify 
the desired location together with the force or distance required to get there. In order to 
construct good S-Box, the author initiated the permutation using the trinomial function 
composed of three power function. Motivated by pattern of dance with eight different 
direction and 16 different distance, about 108 S-Boxes has been produced. From that number, 
only 24 S-Boxes can be considered as strong due to higher nonlinearity. 
The best S-Box is even better compared to [2]. While, in [39] also by the same author, the 
construction of S-Box was done by composition of method RRA and bee-waggled dance 
introduced in [2-38] respectively. The resulted S-Box has lower security compared to both 
RRA and bee-waggle dance pattern. 
Some construction of S-Box is motivated from an algorithm that based on the biological 
system. One example can be found in [40]. In this paper, the algorithm was inspired by 
artificial immune algorithm family, which also referred as clonal selection algorithm. This 
algorithm mimicking the behavior and capabilities of antibodies in the acquired immune 
system. Using this algorithm, the initial generated S-Box will undergo somatic mutation 
function. The iteration will run several times and maximum time taken will be 10 days. While 
in [41], the same author introduced another biological approach method to construct S-Box. 
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The method called as reversed genetic algorithm. The reversed term referred to a process of 
selecting good S-Box from a pool of S-Box generated by the finite field inversion process as 
implemented in original AES S-Box. This pool of S-Box will then go through a genetic 
algorithm which consists of breeding function, mutation function and lastly the fitness 
function. The breeding function will receive a pair of S-Boxes act as the parent and undergo 
the crossover process to produce two child S-Boxes. These child S-Boxes will be tested for 
their bijectivity and nonlinearity in the next two stated function. The output S-Box can be said 
comparable to chaotic map and waggle bee dance S-Box as stated before. 
5.3. Key-dependent S-Box 
Some paper discussed the construction of dynamic S-Box that has dependency to the secret 
key. In [42], the author proposed two method of implementation. The first one, or less secure 
one, all the element in the S-Box will be XORed with the first byte of key. The second 
method is more secure as the 16-byte key will be XORed first to become 1-byte key. This 
1-byte key is then XORed with all the element in the S-Box. The initial S-Box that is used by 
the author is in the existing AES. By using this way, the S-Box itself will become unknown to 
the adversary. However, this implementation seems unsecure especially for the first method 
due to the risk of unintentionally exposing part of the key to the attacker. Different approach 
of key dependent S-box has been implemented in more recent paper [43]. In this paper, the 
author proposed that each 16 bytes of key will be XORed with each 16 bytes of S-Box row. 
The risk of exposing the key was diminished by applying again the affine transformation to 
the resulted S-Box.  
 
6. S-BOX SECURITY COMPARISON 
Previous two section has listed out several examples of S-Boxes construction over finite field 
8)(2GF . The security of these S-Boxes can be verified at least using two cryptographic 
properties, which are high nonlinearity ( )NL  and low differential uniformity ( )DU . 
6.1. Nonlinearity ( )NL   
The nonlinearity of an S-Box is the main properties of the construction as it provides 
confusion to the input plaintext. This property measure the distance between the set of all 
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affine function nL over 
8)(2GF and Boolean function : (2 ) (2)nf GF GF  and can be 
expressed as  




N d f l

                                                            (24) 
where hd  is the hamming distance. The higher the value of fN , the better the S-Box 
nonlinearity. S-Box that is generated through finite field inversion are believed to have the 
best value of nonlinearity, which is 112.  
6.2. Differential Uniformity 
The differential uniformity of bijective n n  S-Box is defined as 
2,
2( ) max |{ : ( ) ( ) } |n
n
a b
DU F x F x a F x b

   

                                        (25) 
This property take the largest value of difference distribution table. The ideal value should be 
between 2 and 4. For AES S-Box, the DU is 4.  
The S-Box that is generated using finite field inversion is expected to have the same security 
as the original one. However, for S-Box from heuristic method, the average value for both 
properties are less than the original AES S-Box. All type of S-Boxes with its NL  and DU
value is listed in Table 3 for comparison. Some paper listed more than one S-Boxes. The best 
one will be listed in Table 3. 
Table 3. S-Box comparison 
Proposed S-Box NL DU Technique 
AES S-Box 112 4 Finite field inversion 
[16] 112 4 Modified finite field inversion 
[18, 20-21, 23] 112 4 Two affine transform with finite field inversion 
[25] 104 10 Logistic map and Bake map 
[26] 112 12 DCMS and affine transformation 
[27] 108 10 Chaotic map and genetic algorithm 
[28] 106 10 Chaotic map and composition method 
[31] 108 8 Chaotic map and composition method 
[32] 108 12 Elliptic curve chaotic sequence 
[33] 110 10 Chaotic map with TLBO 
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[34] 108 10 3-D four wing autonomous chaotic system 
[35] 110 10 Chaotic scaled Zhongtang System 
[37] S-Box 2 108 6 Trinomial power function 
[37] S-Box 3 106 6 Binomial Power function 
[38] 108 6 Bee Waggle Dance 
[39] Opt 1 102 6 Hybrid Heuristic 
[39] Opt 2 104 6 Hybrid Heuristic 
[40] 104 6 Modified Immune algorithm 
[41] S-Box 4 110 2 Reversed genetic algorithm 
[41] S-Box 5 112 6 Reversed genetic algorithm 
6.3. Remarks 
A summary of security performance comparison is given in Table 3. Based on this comparison, 
we can conclude that the overall performance of S-Box from heuristic approach is still under 
par compared to original AES S-Box. However, there are some construction that has 
comparable NL and better DU  compared to original AES S-Box. S-Box that is generated 
through chaotic map alone may not produce better S-Box due to the random sequence that is 
originated from random chosen parameters. However, when there is combination of chaotic 
map and other structured method, we can see that the resulted S-Box has the security 
performance that is approaching to original AES S-Box. Using some hybrid of two method 
may not produce the best S-Box compared to single method. This has been shown in [39] 
where two method from [37-38] combined to produce one hybrid method. Meanwhile S-Box 
that is generated using finite field inversion still maintained the security performance. 
However, there is some drawback related to implementation efficiency when there are two 
affine transform involves. Lastly, for S-Box that has dependency to secret key, the security 
performance may vary as it based on user input secret key. Besides, some implementation 
may have a risk of exposing the part of the key to adversary.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have listed out several implementations of S-Box. This implementation can 
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be classified into two approach which are algebraic approach and heuristic approach. From 
the comparison of S-Box in Table 3, the S-Box generated using finite field inversion have the 
best security compared to heuristic method. However, the search for S-Box using heuristic 
method that has the same security as finite field inversion method is still an open problem.  
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